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In this essay, I review the theory of statutory interpretation
1
advanced in Justice Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty. The book
received a good deal of press because the short work was
interpreted as a liberal’s riposte to Justice Antonin Scalia’s A Matter
2
of Interpretation. Justice Breyer devotes a substantial majority of his
treatise to constitutional interpretation. Other reviewers have
3
focused principally upon that aspect of the book. Yet I believe that
† Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. Program for Judicial Awareness
Working Paper No. 06-002. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Pacific Legal Foundation’s Program for Judicial Awareness in bringing this essay to
fruition.
1. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
2. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
3. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J.
1675 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to
Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2006); Richard A. Posner,
Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699 (2006); James E. Ryan,
Does It Take A Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1623 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J.
1719 (2006); George F. Will, Mr. Breyer’s Modesty, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at 72.

1081

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 14
11. SCHIFF - RC.DOC

1082

4/10/2007 1:03:55 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

the ideas about how to interpret statutes that Justice Breyer
discusses in Active Liberty are just as important as his thinking about
the Federal Constitution. In this review essay, my goal is to show
that Justice Breyer’s theory of statutory interpretation routinely fails
to achieve its objective: the identification of congressional intent.
Along the way I outline my own theory of interpretation—a
variation of textualism—to demonstrate that plausible and
objective interpretations of legal text are possible without recourse
to non-statutory materials.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. A Quick Primer on Interpretation
In recent years, the field of statutory interpretation has
4
blossomed, and there are almost as many theories about
interpretation as there are professors to expound them. This
review adds something new, but without changing the terms of the
game. To understand exactly what Justice Breyer advocates in
Active Liberty, this review essay uses the existing terms that govern
scholarly debate about statutory interpretation.
Interpretive systems are commonly divided into the purposivist,
5
intentionalist, and textualist camps. These categories are not airtight, and there is considerable cross-over both in practice and on
6
the theoretical level. Generally speaking, a purposivist interprets
4. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 241 (1992) (“[T]he past decade has
probably been the most fruitful in history for legal academics in the field of
legislation.”); see also Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory
Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9,
app. at 23–29 (2000) (listing recent articles on statutory interpretation).
5. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990). My principal difference with
Eskridge and Frickey is that intention and purpose, in this context, are essentially
coterminous, and that “intentionalism” is a genus containing the species of
textualism and purposivism, in contrast to Eskridge’s undoubtedly exotic and nonintentionalist “dynamic” hermeneutic.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58–68 (1994).
6. Compare Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re
Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is An Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967, 972–82 (2004) (arguing that, because intention-free interpretation is a
conceptual impossibility, even textualists must concede a role to legislative intent)
with Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 82–83 (2000)
(arguing that textualists and intentionalists are distinguishable based upon their
differing interpretive goals). But cf. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91–92 (2006) (noting that important
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statutory language in light of, and to effect, the statute’s purpose,
7
however that purpose is divined. An intentionalist interprets legal
text according to the intent of those who gave that text the force of
8
law, relying upon a variety of statutory and non-statutory materials.
A textualist interprets statutes consistent with the common
understanding of the words comprising the legal text at the time
9
the text was enacted.
B. Categorizing Justice Breyer’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation
In Active Liberty, Justice Breyer contends that a judge should
10
give effect to the will of the enacting legislature; in appropriate
circumstances, Justice Breyer would achieve that goal through
purposivism. That mode of interpretation, as Justice Breyer
understands it, requires the judge to give primacy in doubtful cases
to the “purpose” of the statute, as that is ascertained through
recourse to statutory text, legislative history materials, and nonstatutory interpretive aids:
differences between textualists and purposivists remain, notwithstanding recent
scholarship to the contrary); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (downplaying differences between textualists and
purposivists); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 349–51 (2005)
(noting that textualists and intentionalists differ in how they distinguish between
“rules and standards,” but not necessarily in their desire to vindicate legislative
intent). A textualist is an intentionalist who seeks to effectuate a statute’s
“purpose” by adherence to its text.
Purposivism, although conceivably
intentionalist, breaks from textualism in that it attempts to induce from statutory
and non-statutory sources the purpose animating a particular statute. It then
interprets, through deductive reasoning, the terms of the statute through the lens
of that purpose. Members of the intentionalist camp aim to effectuate the
legislature’s intent, but the textualist will normally end the search for intent with
the text. In contrast, the purposivist may rely on extraneous aids to vindicate the
legislature’s authentic purpose, which at times may be inconsistent with the text.
And yet textualists can be purposivists or intentionalists, differing from their
colleagues only in that their search for purpose or intention is limited to the legal
text.
7. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 332–39.
8. See id. at 325–32.
9. Professor Eskridge amusingly concludes that today “[w]e are all
textualists.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1090
(2001). Yet he also describes Justice Breyer as a “pragmatic textualist,” which
apparently means nothing more than a judge’s gracious—but still pro forma—nod
to the text before a non-textual interpretive jaunt. See id. at 1094–95.
10. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 101 (“[J]udicial use of the ‘will of the
reasonable legislator’—even if at times it is a fiction—helps statutes match their
means to their overall public policy objectives, a match that helps translate the
popular will into sound policy.”).
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At the heart of a purpose-based approach stands the
“reasonable member of Congress”—a legal fiction that
applies, for example, even when Congress did not in fact
consider a particular problem. The judge will ask how
this person (real or fictional), aware of the statute’s
language, structure, and general objectives (actually or
hypothetically), would have wanted a court to interpret
the statute in light of present circumstances in the
11
particular case.
For the non-purposivist textualist, on the other hand, inquiries
into what the legislature would have wanted from the court’s
interpretation are unnecessary because of the nearly irrebuttable
presumption that the plain meaning of the words used in the
12
statute best captures the legislature’s intent. To the extent that a
statute’s plain meaning produces an “absurd”—as opposed to a
merely undesirable—result, the non-purposivist is empowered to
interpret in a manner seemingly inconsistent with the text. But
these opportunities are much less frequent for the textualist than
for the purposivist.
As mentioned above, purposivist judges interpret statutory
language in light of the purposes of the statute. They vindicate
those purposes through their interpretation. Although Justice
13
Breyer is a purposivist, he also sings the praises of intentionalism.
Intentionalist judges interpret statutory language to give effect to
the intentions of the enacting legislature. To the extent that two
persons can agree that the best (and largely conclusive) evidence of
a statute’s text is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used,
the distinction between textualists and intentionalists is minimal.
Traditional intentionalists hold that legislators mean what they say
14
and say what they mean by voting on particular language; and that
the legislature as a corporate body says what it means through the
15
text of the statutes it enacts.
Justice Breyer apparently has no
11. Id. at 88.
12. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 340.
[S]everal judges of the law and economics school have responded to the
critique of purposivism by urging as a grand theory the return to some
version of the old “plain meaning rule”: The beginning, and usually the
end, of statutory interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the
statutory language.
Id.
13. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 87–88.
14. See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
15. In doing so, perhaps one can avoid Judge Easterbrook’s criticisms of the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/14

4

Schiff: Purposivism and the "Reasonable Legislator"?: A Review Essay of J
11. SCHIFF - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:03:55 PM

JUSTICE BREYER’S ACTIVE LIBERTY

1085

16

quarrel with these principles.
Where he parts company with
jurists such as Antonin Scalia is in those doubtful cases where
17
textual meaning is not obvious.
Justice Breyer espouses a “purposive” approach because, he
argues, it is “more consistent with the framework for a ‘delegated
18
democracy’ that the Constitution creates.”
He describes
textualists as those jurists who have frequent recourse to the canons
of statutory interpretation and who “‘prefer[] the language and
structure of the law whenever possible over its legislative history
19
and imputed values.’”
Textualists are “to avoid invocation of
vague or broad statutory purposes and instead . . . consider such
20
purposes at ‘lower levels of generality.’”
Opposed to the textualist is the purposivist, whose methods
Justice Breyer describes in the following passage:
Other judges look primarily to the statute’s purposes for
enlightenment. They avoid the use of interpretive canons.
They allow context to determine the level of generality at
which they will describe a statute’s purpose . . . . They
“intent of the legislature.” See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive
for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”). See generally Kenneth Shepsle,
Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 239 (1992). Professor Shepsle contends that “[l]egislative intent is an
internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression . . . [that] has no meaning.”
Id. at 239. In its place, he proposes:
only partially in jest . . . the establishment, along the lines of the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), of a legislative agency organized to
transmit to the courts, either informally in consultant reports or formally
in amicus briefs, a detailed procedural history of a statute. Unlike more
conventional legislative histories, this report would highlight exercises of
agenda power, procedural practices (like restrictive rules) that determine
what is and is not brought to a vote, and expressions of individual
legislative intent.
Id. at 254 n.27 (explaining what would be quite considerable legislative history).
16. “Most judges start in the same way. They look first to the statute’s
language, its structure, and its history in an effort to determine the statute’s
purpose. They then use that purpose . . . to determine the proper interpretation.
Thus far, there is agreement [between purposivists and textualists].” BREYER, supra
note 1, at 86.
17. But see Ryan, supra note 3, at 1656–57 (casting the “active liberty” criterion
as “a form of originalism, albeit at a higher level of generality than the originalism
espoused by Justice Scalia” and characterizing Breyer’s opinions in the Ten
Commandments cases as being essentially originalist in tenor).
18. BREYER, supra note 1, at 85 (quoting Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28–29 (2002)).
19. Id. at 87 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 64).
20. Id.
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speak in terms of congressional “intent,” while
understanding that legal conventions govern the use of
that term to describe, not the intent of any, or every,
individual legislator, but the intent of the group . . . . And
they examine legislative history, often closely, in the hope
that the history will help them better understand the
context, the enacting legislators’ objectives, and ultimately
the statute’s purposes. At the heart of a purpose-based
approach stands the “reasonable member of Congress”—a
legal fiction that applies, for example, even when
Congress did not in fact consider a particular problem.
The judge will ask how this person (real or fictional),
aware of the statute’s language, structure, and general
objectives (actually or hypothetically), would have wanted a
court to interpret the statute in light of present
21
circumstances in the particular case.
Thus, for Justice Breyer, the “reasonable legislator” is at the
heart of statutory interpretation.
Using the foregoing framework, we can now approach the
analytic heart of this review essay, which aims (1) to demonstrate
the unworkability of Justice Breyer’s “reasonable legislator”
22
criterion, and (2) to show (only slightly tongue-in-cheek) how a
particular brand of textualism (felicitously termed Blackstone
Variant Textualism (BVT)) produces the better result and more
23
closely hews to the democratic foundation of our government.
II. THE CASES
In Active Liberty, Justice Breyer provides three cases that show,
in his opinion, the superiority of the reasonable legislator criterion
24
Each case is reviewed below to
to the textualist method.
demonstrate how the non-purposivist method produces the better

21. Id. at 87–88. Cf. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 18.
When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said,
but on the basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no
necessary connection between the two, your best shot at figuring out
what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent
person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the
conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean . . . .
Id. For sharp criticism of a theory of interpretation that places results over
process, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 261–65 (1990).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. BREYER, supra note 1, at 88–101.
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25

result, and how a full-blown purposivist analysis does not reliably
capture the enacting legislature’s purpose.
A. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson

26

Dole Food Co. concerned the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
27
(FSIA) and the right of instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns to
28
remove cases to federal court. The FSIA defines an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” as an entity, “a majority of whose
29
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state.”
The instrumentalities at issue—the Dead Sea Companies—were not
30
directly owned by the State of Israel. At least one tier of corporate
31
governance separated them from the state. In other words, the
32
Dead Sea Companies were indirect subsidiaries. Applying basic
principles of American corporate law, the Court concluded that the
Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of the State of
Israel for the purposes of removal because at no time did the Israeli
33
government own a “majority of the shares” in the Companies.
The Court refused to read the phrase “other ownership interest” to
include the indirect interest that the Israeli Government had in the
34
Companies. The better reading, according to the Court, was to
interpret the phrase “other ownership interest” in relation to the
35
immediately preceding word “shares.” The Court thus read the
phrase to include the possibility that a state’s direct ownership of
corporate entities may take forms different from the traditional
36
“shares” concept.
To read the phrase to encompass indirect
37
ownership would render superfluous the use of the term
25. In the sense of being truer to original intent, or least likely to be the
interpreter’s disguised policy preferences.
26. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2000).
28. 538 U.S. at 470–72.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2000).
30. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 473 (the Dead Sea Companies were subsidiaries
of a parent owned by the State of Israel).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 473–74.
33. Id. at 474–75.
34. Id. at 476.
35. Id. (“The words ‘other ownership interest,’ when following the word
‘shares,’ should be interpreted to refer to a type of interest other than ownership
of stock.”).
36. Id.
37. The “superfluity” canon is another window to purposefulness that the
textualist will look through upon occasion. It is based on the same limited
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38

“shares.”
Writing in dissent, and joined by Justice O’Connor, Justice
Breyer urged that the correct reading of the phrase “other
ownership interest” includes the type of indirect “ownership” (in a
colloquial sense) that the Israeli Government maintained in the
39
Dead Sea Companies.
Justice Breyer noted that the phrase is
patently ambiguous because the term “ownership” does not have a
40
precise meaning. He rehearsed the case law in which the Court
41
had interpreted indirect ownership to fall under “ownership.”
Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the use
of the word “shares” settled the matter because the majority was
also concerned about foreign methods of ownership, which might
42
have nothing to do with “shares.”
Justice Breyer cautioned that “[s]tatutory interpretation is not
a game of blind man’s bluff,” and he emphasized that “[j]udges are
free to consider statutory language in light of a statute’s basic
43
purposes.”
He concluded that the majority’s reading would
44
frustrate the statute’s purpose and therefore should be rejected.
conclusion that we shall not presume the legislature to waste words when enacting
laws. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 644 (2d ed. 1995) (considering
superfluity canon as part of “whole act” rule).
38. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 476–77.
39. Id. at 481–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). Justice Breyer noted that
“Congress is most unlikely to characterize as ‘better’ a rule tied to legal formalities
that undercuts its basic jurisdictional objective.” Id. at 486.
40. Justice Breyer described ownership as a nomen generalissimum—that is, “its
meaning is to be gathered from the connection in which it is used.” Id. at 481–82
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1049, 1105 (6th ed. 1990)).
41. Id. at 482. Justice Breyer relied heavily upon Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59
(1929), which concerned federal statutes that limited shipowners’ liability to their
proportional interests in their vessels. There the Court interpreted the statutes’
purpose as “encourag[ing] investment by exempting the investor from loss in
excess of the fund he is willing to risk in the enterprise.” Id. at 62 (internal
quotations omitted) (citation omitted). Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority,
concluded that “[f]or this purpose no rational distinction can be taken between
several persons owning shares in a vessel directly and making the same division by
putting the title in a corporation and distributing the corporate stock.” Id.
42. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 483.
43. Id. at 484.
44. Id. at 486–87. Justice Breyer asks rhetorically, “[w]hy place greater weight
on the [superfluity] canon suggesting a need to give every statutory word a
separate meaning than upon the statute’s overall purpose?” BREYER, supra note 1,
at 125. Two answers come to mind. First, the canon against superfluities is as old
as the hills and can fairly be presumed to be within Congress’s collective ken when
enacting legislation. See, e.g., Wash. Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879).
There the Court stated:
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The available legislative history revealed that Congress wanted to
ensure that claims against foreign sovereigns were adjudicated in
45
federal court.
Given these purposes, what might lead Congress to grant
protection to a Foreign Nation acting through a
Corporate Parent but deny the same protection to the
Foreign Nation acting through, for example, a wholly
owned Corporate Subsidiary? The answer to this question
is: In terms of the statute’s purposes, nothing at all would
46
lead Congress to make such a distinction.
Justice Breyer thus concluded that a purposivist reading
should lead the Court to permit the Dead Sea Companies to
47
remove the action to federal court.
The main problem with Justice Breyer’s analysis is that it leads
to question-begging. Purpose is always at the heart of the
interpretation, yet to presume to know the purpose of the statute
48
49
from a text that is admittedly ambiguous suggests circularity.
[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect
shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon’s
Abridgment, sect. 2, it was said that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ This rule has been repeated
innumerable times.
Id. at 115–16 (emphasis added); see also Postmaster Gen. v. Early, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat) 136, 148 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) (“And it is, we think, a rule, that words
which have a meaning, are not to be entirely disregarded in construing a
statute.”).
Second, judges are professionally trained to interpret legal text and are
less likely to be entranced by the “dark side” of tenure in interpreting statutory
text than in divining statutory purpose. Cf. Frank Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004). Judge Easterbrook writes that,
[a]lthough judges are more apt to be dispassionate than are political
officials, their dispassion need not lead them to be more faithful to either
old decisions or the median view of today’s legal culture; it may lead
them to be more faithful to their own views. This is the dark side of
tenure. Like the Force in Star Wars, tenure has both a good side and a
dark side. Just as with the Force, the dark side is self-indulgence; if
contemporary opinion and politics do not sway the judge, then the
judge’s own druthers become more important.
Id. at 9–10 (footnote omitted).
45. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 485 (noting that federal jurisdiction “should be
conducive to uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate treatment
of cases involving foreign governments may have an adverse foreign relations
consequences”) (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 486–87.
48. One commentator posits that whether an interpreter is likely to find
ambiguity in the text is not a function of his being textualist or purposivist, but
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Justice Breyer’s legislative history notwithstanding, one can posit
several reasons why Congress would want to limit the scope of the
FSIA to corporations in which the state maintains a direct majority
ownership interest. First, perhaps Congress wanted to provide the
courts (and foreign sovereigns) an easy method of determining
whether any particular entity, despite a Byzantine legal structure,
enjoys the protections of the FSIA. Second, in attempting to
balance on the one hand the potentially adverse foreign policy
consequences of not affording FSIA protection to certain foreign
state instrumentalities, and on the other hand the potentially
adverse consequences on plaintiffs who seek to have their claims
adjudicated in state courts and instead must change forum,
Congress may have decided to draw the line between those entities
so closely associated with the foreign state that they are in fact
directly owned by the state, and those entities which, although
perhaps very much controlled by the state, are not owned directly.
Third, Congress may have considered that even though an indirect
subsidiary of a foreign state will not enjoy the protections of the
FSIA, the judgment creditor, should he wish to pierce the
corporate veil, will still have to combat the FSIA as against the
corporate parents directly owned by the foreign state.
Instead of asking Justice Breyer why Congress would limit the
FSIA to direct subsidiaries, one might as well ask why Congress
would limit the FSIA to those subsidiaries in which the foreign state
owns a majority of the shares. The policies of the FSIA as Justice
Breyer sets them forth (especially the policy against international
contretemps) are equally implicated in a suit against a direct
rather of “how much confidence the interpreter has in textual meaning and how
aggressively he employs tools of interpretation.” Molot, supra note 6, at 42.
49. Justice Breyer writes in Active Liberty that the “purpose of the [FSIA’s]
jurisdictional provision is to bring into federal court cases in which a foreign
government owns a commercial defendant.” BREYER, supra note 1, at 90. This too
seems to be question-begging if the focus of disagreement is over the meaning of
“ownership.” Justice Breyer argues that it is all about ownership; indeed, but what
kind of ownership? Direct or indirect? Shares or otherwise? Majority or minority?
By phrasing the purpose as he does, Justice Breyer assumes that ownership in the
statute should be interpreted colloquially. That is certainly, in vacuo, a defensible
position, but it by no means demands assent to his conclusion regarding the
statute’s purpose. As usual, journeys into purpose tend to degrade into debates
about levels of generality. See BORK, supra note 21, at 149–51, 237.
50. Reliance upon which necessarily raises the red flag. See Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930) (“A legislative intent,
undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if it were discovered . . . is a queerly amorphous
piece of slag.”).
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subsidiary in which the state does not own a majority interest but
over which the state exercises substantial control, as in a suit against
an indirect subsidiary of a foreign state. Would Justice Breyer then
read “majority of whose shares or other ownership interest” to be
coterminous with “substantial control?” That reading would
effectuate the purpose of the statute as he sees it, yet this “would be
51
judicial legislation,-jus dare, not jus dicere.”
Like all legislation, the FSIA seeks to balance competing
52
concerns. It is a misunderstanding of the nature of lawmaking in
a democratic system to assume that each statute will, like a good
53
work of art, show forth consistent and well-developed themes. In
fact, democratic legislation is more often than not a hodgepodge of
54
competing special interests. The FSIA is no different. Is the FSIA
in favor of foreign states? Against them? Or both? The question
cannot be answered, and trying to answer it leads to what might be
termed interpretive creep. By that phrase I mean the process of
interpreting particular provisions of a statute in light of the
51. Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 623 (1849) (lawmaking, not
interpretation).
52. See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1113
(9th Cir. 2000) (“Legislation often results from a delicate compromise among
competing interests and concerns.”).
53. But see BREYER, supra note 1, at 7 (citing Learned Hand for the
proposition that interpretation of a statute is like interpretation of a musical
score). “Theme-based” interpretation, or even the accuracy of Hart and Sack’s
famous description of a legislature as a group of reasonable people pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably—see 2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415
(tentative ed. 1958)—appears at least to have been called into question by modern
public choice theory. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 335. There the
authors note that
[i]t seems clear not only that reasonable people in the legislature do not
always produce reasonable results, but that in some cases that is the last
thing they want to do. Some statutes are little else but backroom deals.
Judicial attempts to fancy up those deals with public-regarding rhetoric
either are naïve or simply substitute the judge’s conception of public
policy for that of the legislature.
Id.
54. Thus is revealed one of the principal shortcomings of purposivism: “that
it tends to override legislative compromises.” Posner, supra note 3, at 1710. See
also Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Scalia,
J.). There Justice Scalia wrote:
And as for advancing “the purpose of the Act”: We have often criticized
that last resort of extravagant interpretation, noting that no law pursues
its purpose at all costs, and that the textual limitations upon a law’s scope
are no less a part of its “purpose” than its substantive authorizations.
Id. at 2232.
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statute’s supposed purpose such that, after a series of
interpretations, the statute as a whole, as judicially interpreted, falls
decidedly more to one side of the policy balance than would have
been possible given the ideological make-up of the enacting
legislature.
One federal environmental law susceptible to interpretive
55
creep is the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
The ESA’s chief
56
purpose is the preservation of endangered flora and fauna. The
Supreme Court long ago determined that, through the ESA,
Congress wished to give the preservation of species the highest
57
priority.
But obviously not everyone believes that these goals
should be pursued at all times and at all costs. Each substantive
provision of the ESA undoubtedly represents a particular legislative
compromise between those who wanted more species protection
and those who wanted to preserve more freedom for development.
In other words, each ESA provision reflects a purpose, but the
degree to which each provision vindicates that purpose necessarily
varies, and the best (and likely only) way of finding out just how
much the provision pursues the general purpose is by close
attention to the provision’s text. Not to follow this course
eventually will upset each of the ESA’s legislatively brokered
compromises (and the compromises found in all legislation). A
purposivist interpretation will cause a statute to morph over time so
that it reflects more and more a particular lobby in the enacting
Congress, thereby giving effect to that lobby’s views to a degree not
democratically justifiable. Interpretive creep is an unavoidable and
undesirable consequence of purposivism.
58

B. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams

The second example Justice Breyer offers is Circuit City, a
recent Supreme Court case dealing with the exclusion provision of
59
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Ninth Circuit had held,
contrary to every other circuit to have addressed the question, that
60
employment contracts do not fall within the FAA’s ambit. The
relevant statutory text states that the FAA does not apply to
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
Id. § 1531(b).
See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
Id. at 109.
See id.
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“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
61
commerce.” All but the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the phrase
“other class of workers” to be limited by the examples of workers
62
preceding it; in other words, the courts had narrowed the scope of
63
the phrase using the well-established canon ejusdem generis. Under
that canon, words of potentially broad scope are read narrowly so
as to make them consistent with the class of things enumerated in
preceding clauses. Thus, most courts had construed the broad
language in section 1 of the FAA to be restricted to other types of
64
transportation workers.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that
65
section 1 of the FAA should be read consistent with ejusdem generis.
The Court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation did not
give independent effect to the particular types of transportation
workers described in the preceding clauses: the broad reading of
“other class of workers” would encompass those classes already
enumerated, thus rendering the preceding portion of the statutory
66
text superfluous. The Court also noted that its interpretation was
consistent with Congress’s use of the term of art “engaged in
commerce,” which indicates a less-than-full exercise of the
67
Commerce Clause power. The respondent had argued that the
“engaged in commerce” phrase, when used in the FAA at its
enactment in 1925, expressed very nearly the limits of the
Commerce Clause power as then understood and should be
interpreted as a sign that Congress believed it was constitutionally
68
required to exempt all employment contracts from the FAA.
The Court rejected the contention that the meaning of the
phrase “engaged in commerce” must change over time just as
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has changed since the FAA’s
61. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
62. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112.
63. “Of the same kind, class, or nature.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (4th
rev. ed. 1968).
64. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112 (explaining that “[m]ost [c]ourts of

[a]ppeals conclude the exclusion provision is limited to transportation
workers, defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the
movement of goods in interstate commerce’”).
65. Id. at 115 (holding that “[t]he application of the rule ejusdem generis in
this case . . . is in full accord with other sound considerations bearing upon
the proper interpretation of the clause”).
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 114–15.
See id. at 115–16.
Id. at 116.
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69

enactment in 1925. The opinion emphasized that it “would be
unwieldy for Congress, for the Court, and for litigants to be
required to deconstruct statutory Commerce Clause phrases
70
depending upon the year of a particular statutory enactment.”
The Court also noted, perhaps gratuitously, that its narrow reading
of section 1 was consistent with the FAA’s unquestioned purpose,
71
i.e., overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.
The case produced two dissenting opinions, one by Justice
Stevens, the other by Justice Souter, both joined by Justice Breyer.
Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that the legislative history of the
FAA makes clear that the statute was designed to remedy judicial
72
hostility to commercial arbitration. Organized labor feared that
73
the FAA might be used against its concerns. Chief among the
labor opponents was the International Seamen’s Union of
74
America.
In response to labor’s concerns, the American Bar
Association, principal sponsor of the FAA, suggested that the
problem could be avoided by adding the text of section 1, which
75
would purportedly exempt all employment contracts. In response
to the majority’s “surplusage” argument, Justice Stevens argued that
“it is not ‘pointless’ to adopt a clarifying amendment in order to
76
eliminate opposition to a bill.” He excoriated the majority for “its
refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text” and thus its
“disregard[ing of] countervailing considerations that were
77
expressed by Members of the enacting Congress.”
Justice Souter’s dissent also emphasized that the correct
interpretation of section 1, like that of section 2 of the FAA,
78
required a “correspondingly evolutionary reading.”
Justice
69. Id. at 118.
70. Id.
71. See id. The Court also noted that the FAA’s legislative history was sparse
and unhelpful. Id. at 119–20.
72. Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 126–27.
74. Id. at 126.
75. Id. at 127.
76. Id. at 128.
77. Id. at 132.
78. See id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The question here is whether a similarly general phrase in the [section] 1
exemption, referring to contracts of “any . . . class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce,” should receive a correspondingly
evolutionary reading, so as to expand the exemption for employment
contracts to keep pace with the enhanced reach of the general
enforceability provision.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/14

14

Schiff: Purposivism and the "Reasonable Legislator"?: A Review Essay of J
11. SCHIFF - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:03:55 PM

JUSTICE BREYER’S ACTIVE LIBERTY

1095

Souter’s dissent endorsed the temporally sensitive interpretive
79
theory of the Commerce Clause that the majority rejected. As for
the majority’s use of ejusdem generis, Souter characterized the canon
80
as a “fallback” whose admonition was trumped by Congress’s
particular desire in the FAA to exempt, out of an abundance of
81
caution, seamen and rail workers for whom legislation governing
82
employment contracts already existed.
Describing the majority’s method as a “more literal, text-based
83
approach,” Justice Breyer in Active Liberty considers the dissents to
84
evince “a more directly purposive approach.”
Justice Breyer
rehearses the legislative history, detailing the seamen union’s
85
opposition and the ABA’s suggested remedy. Assuming that this
legislative history accurately described the purpose of the section 1
exemption, Justice Breyer concludes that the majority’s narrow
86
reading is inconsistent with that purpose.
He reasons that it
makes sense that the exemption should be read broadly: at the
time of the FAA’s enactment, Congress understood its Commerce
Clause power to be far narrower than it is now; and in any event,
the express mentioning of seamen and rail workers in section 1 can
be chalked up to Congress’s desire to assuage the fears of an
87
especially important interest group.
As for the temporally sensitive interpretive method, Justice
Breyer notes that courts have read the FAA’s principal regulatory
provision, section 2, more broadly as the scope of the Commerce
88
Clause power has expanded.
So why, Justice Breyer questions
provocatively, “would Congress not have wanted an expanding
89
exception of similar scope?”
Conceding that the result of the
majority’s opinion—more labor contracts subject to arbitration—
90
may actually be desirable as a policy matter, Justice Breyer
nevertheless bemoans the majority’s analysis for its indifference to
Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 136–37.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 139.
BREYER, supra note 1, at 92.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94–95.
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Congress’s clearly established purpose of providing for arbitration
91
in commercial disputes yet exempting employment contracts.
The error in Justice Breyer’s analysis is, again, not so much in
the application, but in first principles. He assumes that the
purpose of the statute is evinced by the substance of subcommittee
hearing testimony. He reasons that because the majority’s result is
inconsistent with that testimony, the analysis has necessarily
frustrated Congress’s intent. Justice Breyer and the two Circuit City
dissents simply ignore that the purpose of section 1 is in fact
evident on its face: to exempt what would otherwise be within the
scope of the FAA. Sparse citations to legislative history to establish
legislative purpose do not, at first blush at least, help to answer the
interpretive question of the extent of the section 1 exemption.
Further, both Justice Breyer and the dissents are indifferent to the
fact that ejusdem generis (which neither Justice Breyer nor the
dissents dispute is applicable in Circuit City) is a well-established
canon that likely was within the mind of Congress when enacting
92
the FAA. By contrast, during the 1920s, courts’ use of legislative
93
history was not nearly as common as it is today. Thus, one is left
91. Id. at 95.
92. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487 (1917) (applying
canon to Mann Act); United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 402 (1908) (same);
United States v. Austin Nicholls & Co., 186 U.S. 298, 300 (1902) (applying canon
to Customs Administrative Act of 1890); Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills,
184 U.S. 290, 295 (1902) (applying canon to certiorari provisions of 1891
appellate jurisdiction act). Cf. Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U.S. 45, 49
(1925) (noting canon’s inapplicability where preceding specific classes exhaust
genus); Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 554 (1923) (same).
93. It is not “incoherent” to accord “law” status to text and not to legislative
history materials, notwithstanding ardent pleas about the need for “context” to
understand “text.” But see Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative
History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1268–69 (2005). Obviously, a word of
multiple meanings (or shades of meaning) cannot be understood in isolation, but
the question is one of degree. The level of context “employed” should be the
lowest (or narrowest) required to produce a non-absurd result. In other words, if
the statutory text itself is sufficient to produce an intelligible and rational
principle, then the interpretive endeavor should be over; that is all the “context”
required. The Circuit City dissents’ (and Justice Breyer’s) desire to raise the level
of context to include non-statutory materials unnecessarily complicates the search
for the legislature’s intent. Raising the level of context fails to recognize the supracontextual character of legal principles that can be derived from a “contextual”
statute. And nothing prevents these principles from being applicable to new and
different contexts. Professor McGreal criticizes Justice Scalia (whom he takes as
the avatar of the anti-legislative-history crowd) for ignoring context. See, e.g., id. at
1277 (“Implicit in [Justice Scalia’s] argument is that statutory text has some
meaning on its face, and that congressional committees may not alter that
meaning through legislative history. However, the statute’s so-called facial
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with a 1925 Congress that reasonably would have been aware of
(1) ejusdem generis, (2) the canon’s potential application to section
1, and (3) the distinct unlikelihood that a reviewing court would
disregard the text (as clarified by the canon’s application) in favor
94
of a statement made in a subcommittee hearing in 1923. Is Justice
Breyer really the advocate of the reasonable interpretation?
Further, both Justice Breyer’s and the dissents’ fondness for a
temporally sensitive interpretative methodology is fundamentally at
odds with the notion that the Supreme Court interprets but does
95
not legislate. That is to say, although the Court’s interpretation of
meaning necessarily assumes a context within which that meaning makes sense.”).
Yet the Professor is fairly subject to criticism for ignoring levels of context.
Legislative history is acceptable to Professor McGreal because it is part of the
bicameralism and presentment process; but in a democracy it is not enough that
merely the legislators know what the law means. Legislative history may be
considered broadly to be part of the lawmaking process, but the Constitution
accords law status only to the voted-upon text. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S.
511, 518–28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
94. This conclusion can be supported on several grounds. First, the “plain
meaning rule,” i.e., judges are bound to apply the ordinary meaning of the text
(barring absurdity) and cannot look beyond that text for interpretive guidance,
was even more a judicial cri de coeur then than now. See, e.g., Caminetti, 242 U.S. at
485; United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1914);
Dewey v. United States, 178 U.S. 510, 521 (1900); Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S.
662, 670–71 (1889). It is true that courts would occasionally look to legislative
history, most famously in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892),
and earlier, see generally Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective:
Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991). But even so, the rule was that
“[r]esort to journals and committee reports was permissible; resort to legislative
debates was not,” id. at 1084, and a similar circumspection would have likely been
accorded the hearing transcript cited by Justice Breyer and the Circuit City
dissenters. See Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 498–99
(C.C. Me. 1843) (No. 9662). Further, the plain meaning rule was a strong
counterweight in the early decades of the twentieth century against use of
legislative history. See Baade, supra, at 1087.
Second, as Justice Jackson noted, access to legislative history in the early
twentieth century was not easy; it was rather a luxury enjoyed by big firms in big
cities. Robert H. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 125
(1948). Congress would have been leaning on a slender reed indeed to expect the
Bar to delve into the nearest federal depository to seek support for an
interpretation at odds with the text and the canon.
Third, legislative history did not receive the Supreme Court’s imprimatur
until well into the twentieth century. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310
U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as
used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’”)
(footnotes omitted).
95. Cf. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491–92 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.”).
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the Commerce Clause in 1925 was far more limited than it is today,
that fact has little or nothing to do with the constitutional calculus
as worked out in statutes. It is enough for Congress to say in year 1,
“We legislate to the maximum (or someplace short of that) of our
Commerce Clause power,” to fix the meaning of the statutory text.
Perhaps in year 2 or year 20 the Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause will have changed, but that fact does not alter
the statutory text’s meaning (as opposed to its scope).
Lastly, Justice Breyer’s analysis of Circuit City reveals the
(perhaps ironic) tunnel vision of the purposivist. Justice Breyer
laments the majority’s ignoring of the “only evidence available” of
Congress’s purpose in passing the FAA, i.e., to address the problem
of commercial arbitration while at the same time exempting
96
employment contracts from the solution. Yet Justice Breyer does
not acknowledge that the text of section 1 of the FAA, clarified by
ejusdem generis, provides evidence of Congress’s intent in enacting
the exemption. He ignores the textual evidence and is attracted to
the non-statutory evidence presumably because the latter permits
higher levels of generalization as to purpose; and the higher the
level of purpose, the more that can be fit under the purposive
umbrella. Contrariwise, the lower the level of generality, the more
specific the purpose becomes, until at some point legislative
purpose becomes identified with the text’s plain meaning. The
further judges travel from that point, the more likely it will be that
their “conclusion as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously
influenced by the judges’ own views or by factors not considered by
97
the enacting body.” The closer they hew to the identity point, the
more likely their interpretation will approximate that of the
legislature, assuming of course that legislative intent is best
understood through the statutory text. And that is the purposivist
irony: in seeking interpretive help from nontextual sources, the
purposivist ignores the probative value of traditional interpretive
98
aids and unconsciously pursues personal predilection.

96. BREYER, supra note 1, at 95.
97. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 544. Justice Reed goes on to discount this
fear. Id.
98. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1716 (“[Active liberty] is the name [Justice
Breyer] has given to his own, eclectic collection of policy preferences.”). Posner
ascribes to the theory that all justices, past or present, essentially rule based on
their policy preferences. Id.
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99

C. Duncan v. Walker

The third in Justice Breyer’s purposivist case-law trio, Duncan
concerned the interpretation of the tolling provision of the
100
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
Under
the AEDPA, the time during which a federal habeas petitioner must
file a federal habeas corpus petition is tolled during the pendency
of a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
101
collateral review.”
The timeliness of the Duncan petitioner’s
federal habeas request depended upon how the Court would read
the AEDPA tolling provision. Specifically, if the phrase “other
collateral review” encompassed both state and federal habeas
requests, then the petitioner’s instant habeas would be timely; but
if “other collateral review” referred instead to other types of state
post-conviction review, then the petitioner’s habeas request would
102
be untimely.
The majority began its analysis noting, unsurprisingly, that the
103
Court’s interpretation must begin with the statutory text.
The
majority then set forth a particular application of the canon inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (inclusion of one thing implies exclusion of
others): where Congress uses the phrase “State and Federal” in
some provisions of the AEDPA, and just “State” in other provisions
(as is the case with section 2244(d)(2), the tolling provision at
issue), a congressional purpose to exclude “Federal” matters from
104
those clauses dealing with “State” matters may be inferred.
The
majority’s analysis drew support from a corollary to the abovementioned canon: “‘where Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
105
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”
The
majority further noted that the superfluity canon counseled against
reading the phrase “other collateral review” to include federal

99. 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
100. BREYER, supra note 1, at 95–101.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000) (“The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.”).
102. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 172.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 172–73.
105. Id. at 173 (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1997)).
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106

review. That reading would render the clause’s use of the phrase
“State post-conviction” unnecessary, as that type of review either
would be included within “other collateral review” or would make
the phrase “post-conviction or other collateral review” the
functional equivalent of “State post-conviction or other collateral
107
review.”
The majority also took several pages to show how its
analysis was consistent with the AEDPA’s purpose of furthering the
108
principles of federalism and finality.
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer began his opinion by showing
why a habeas petitioner would want a federal habeas petition to
qualify as “other collateral review” and thus toll the limitations
109
period.
He noted that, oftentimes, petitions are denied not on
the merits but rather for failure to exhaust administrative
110
The majority’s interpretation would produce
remedies.
inconsistent results for similarly situated prisoners because of the
varying amount of time habeas review requires depending upon
111
the district court wherein the petition was filed.
Justice Breyer
contended that the AEDPA tolling provision, section 2244(d)(2),
has no plain meaning, and that the text will bear more than one
112
interpretation.
He dismissed the majority’s inferences drawn
from other parts of the Act as proving only that Congress could
have spoken more clearly in section 2244(d)(2), and that the
113
contextual examples “cannot prove the statutory point.”
Rejecting the majority’s use of the superfluity canon, Justice Breyer
argued that, had Congress intended just to include state postconviction proceedings, it could have stated “State collateral
review” because state post-conviction proceedings are a subset of
114
collateral review.
Justice Breyer then moved to his purposivist analysis, the focus
106. Id. at 173–74.
107. Id. at 174–75. The Court also noted that its reading would not render
“other collateral review” meaningless, because not all types of state custody are the
result of criminal conviction and because some states have multiple forms of postconviction review, including direct and collateral attacks. See id. at 176–78.
108. See id. at 178–81.
109. See id. at 185–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 186–87.
112. Id. at 187.
113. Id. at 188.
114. Id. at 188–89. Although conceding that the majority’s reading would
include state civil proceedings, Justice Breyer concludes that Congress likely did
not have them in mind because other AEDPA provisions reveal that “Congress saw
criminal proceedings as [section 2244(d)(2)’s] basic subject matter.” Id. at 189.
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of which is the resolution of the unexhausted petition problem that
115
the majority’s reading created. Justice Breyer would “ask whether
Congress would have intended to create th[is] kind of
116
‘unexhausted petition’ problem.”
His response was no, because
Congress “would not have intended to shorten th[e] time [to seek
habeas review] dramatically, at random, and perhaps erase it
117
altogether.” Justice Breyer spent the rest of the dissent attacking
118
the merits of the majority’s purposivist analysis. He concluded by
criticizing the majority’s hermeneutic:
Language, dictionaries, and canons, unilluminated by
purpose, can lead courts into blind alleys, producing rigid
interpretations that can harm those whom the statute
affects. If generalized, the approach, bit by bit, will
divorce law from the needs, lives, and values of those
whom it is meant to serve—a most unfortunate result for a
119
people who live their lives by law’s light.
Although Justice Breyer, in his dissent, appeared more willing
to dispute the majority’s application of canons, in his book he
concedes that a “literal reading” of the statute “supported by
120
various linguistic canons” argues for the majority’s interpretation.
He also admits that it is unlikely that anyone in Congress actually
121
thought about the unexhausted petition problem.
But he
contends that the text does not foreclose his interpretation, and
though perhaps less plausible, his version is more consonant with
122
the purposes of the reasonable legislator.
By reading “other
collateral review” to exclude prematurely filed habeas petitions, the
Court imputes to Congress the intention to deny access to the
Great Writ on a random basis, i.e., on the basis of whether a
petitioner who has prematurely requested federal habeas relief has
filed his petition with a relatively faster or slower docket-managing
123
district court.
Because that intention is inconsistent with the
reasonable legislator, and because the purposivist interpretation
avoids the unexhausted petition problem, Justice Breyer concludes

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 190–93.
Id. at 193.
BREYER, supra note 1, at 96.
Id.
Id. at 96–98.
See id. at 97–98.
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124

that the latter interpretation is the better.
There are several problems with Justice Breyer’s analysis. First,
Justice Breyer concedes that the exhausted petition problem was
not likely contemplated by Congress, and he argues for the
propriety of his analysis on the basis of statistics regarding habeas
125
processing in the federal courts, which Congress likely did not
consider when enacting the AEDPA. Instead of asking whether the
126
text can be read to produce a legitimate (non-absurd) principle
of broad application that happens, on occasion, to produce a
seemingly inequitable result, Justice Breyer simply disregards the
principle and seeks independent justification for another principle—
not directly justified by the text—to avoid that occasional inequity
that was not the chief (or even peripheral) concern of Congress.
Second, he favors one purpose, the desire to avoid the occasional
denial of habeas review on a random basis, to another purpose, the
desire to afford tolling to persons in state custody because of civil
127
proceedings (which cannot fit within “post conviction review”).
Third, he concludes without explanation that a reasonable
legislator would not prefer to create incentives for all habeas
petitioners to file only timely petitions at the cost of an occasional
random denial of a petition based upon where the petition was
128
filed.
124. Id. at 98.
125. Id. at 96.
126. Cf. INTRODUCTION TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 611 (Anton C. Pegis ed. &
trans., Random House 1948).
But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature
of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this
sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the
force of law; or otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness
rather than of law.
Id. Contrast St. Thomas’s position with that of John Austin, founder of modern
legal positivism, who famously contended that law is merely the command of the
sovereign backed by sanction. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 197 (1832), for a discussion of legal positivism and the
role of the sovereign.
127. BREYER, supra note 1, at 96–97. It is not clear whether Justice Breyer’s
reading of the clause would exclude state civil custody petitioners. If seeking relief
from state civil custody is not classifiable under the “post-conviction” part of the
clause, and if “State” does not apply to the “other collateral review” part of the
clause (which one would have to concede so as to avoid rendering “State”
superfluous, assuming that post-conviction relief is a subset of collateral review),
then state civil custody petitioners would be targeted for exclusion from section
2244(d)(2)’s tolling. Would Congress have any reason for singling out that class
of (by definition) non-criminals?
128. BREYER, supra note 1, at 97–98.
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But Justice Breyer’s principal error is his criticism of the
Duncan majority’s textualist analysis, which he believes “will divorce
law from the needs, lives, and values of those whom it is meant to
129
serve.”
Is it not the province of the legislature to ascertain
whether law has become outmoded, or passé, or archaic, or simply
ceases best to serve the common good? It is, after all, principally
for the legislature to determine whether the law is serving the
needs, lives, and values of the people. The regulated public has an
excellent means of telling the legislature whether, in fact, the law is
serving its needs: the voting booth. That avenue of communication
130
does not run to the courthouse.
Justice Breyer argues that citizens (and presumably legislators)
131
think in terms of general purposes.
Therefore, to promote
legislative accountability, courts should interpret statutes according
to their purposes, so that the electorate will know, in Justice
132
Breyer’s example, whom to blame for misinterpreting the FAA.
Justice Breyer is wrong on two points. First, Justice Breyer
misconceives the relevant concern. It does not matter whether
citizens think in terms of generalities (although assuredly they do),
or whether legislators think about policies in terms of generalities
(which assuredly they also do), but rather whether the
Constitution, or more broadly a democratic system, vests in the
legislature or the judiciary the responsibility to reduce general
purposes into specific commands embodied in rules. This duty
rests with the legislature. And if the legislature has failed
adequately to reduce its general policies into specific rules that
sufficiently serve those policies, then the best service the judiciary
can render the electorate is to interpret those specific rules so as
not to serve the general policies, and thereby demonstrate the flaws
133
in the statutes.
Second, Justice Breyer’s contention that the electorate is not
able to draw meaningful conclusions about the policies embodied
129. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 193 (2001).
130. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1729 (arguing that Breyer’s statutory
interpretation is flawed because he gives too little deference to administrative
agencies and too little respect to canons); Ryan, supra note 3, at 1655 (“Trying to
make good policy may be a worthwhile project for federal judges, but it remains
essentially unjustified in Justice Breyer’s book.”).
131. BREYER, supra note 1, at 99.
132. Id. at 100.
133. But see Ryan, supra note 3, at 1658 (“It must be right that most American
citizens know and care almost nothing about interpretive methodology.
Presumably, they care about results.”).
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in law from court decisions that hew to the text and the canons is
erroneous. The electorate can easily infer the proper conclusions
based upon a statute’s text and its plain meaning, which of course
is the principal public meaning of the law. The canons are simply
the crystallized form of common-sense observations about purpose
134
as expressed in the written word. The layman reading a legal text
is likely to perform the same analysis as the canon-minded judge,
just not explicitly. To the extent that a court decision varies in
result from that which is dictated by a law’s text, the electorate
becomes more prone to confusion, for now it cannot be sure
whether (1) the decision is based upon Congress’s bad purpose,
(2) Congress’s maladroit drafting, or (3) the court’s erroneous
understanding of Congress’s purpose. At least with the method
advanced in this essay, the studious electorate is only confronted by
135
possibilities (1) and (2).
III. A THIRD WAY?
A review essay is not the most auspicious place for setting forth
136
a coherent and universal theory of interpretation, but it seems
only fair to offer up some alternative to Justice Breyer’s proposal.
That alternative I call Blackstone Variant Textualism (BVT). This
brand of textualism not only differs markedly from the purposivism
of Justice Breyer and produces a process (as opposed to results)
more in tune with the democratic system than does Justice Breyer’s
theory; it also adheres faithfully to historical practices in
137
interpretation
which, one expects, were at least within the

134. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 544 (1947).
[C]anons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact
a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process of balancing
subtle and elusive elements . . . . So far as valid, they are what Mr. Justice
Holmes called them, axioms of experience . . . . Insofar as canons of
construction are generalizations of experience, they all have worth.
Id., quoted in Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 452 n.164 (1989).
135. For a criticism of Justice Breyer’s theory based upon his insufficient
regard for canons of interpretation, see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1736.
136. See Ryan, supra note 3, at 1655.
137. Which include the canons. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1099–1100
(“One thing that can be said with assurance is that judges and lawyers throughout
the framing and consolidating periods understood the importance of the canons
of statutory construction . . . . They were the lingua franca of statutory
interpretation.”) (footnote omitted).
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138

contemplation of those ratifying the Constitution.
Generally, the framers—and the ratifiers learned in the law—
139
were very familiar with the work of William Blackstone, and an
exemplar of sound statutory interpretation can be found in
140
For the great Vinerian professor,
Blackstone’s Commentaries.
“[t]he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the
legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law
141
was made, by signs the most natural and probable.”
Those signs
include words, context, subject matter, effects and consequence,
142
and the “spirit and reason” of the law. These “signs” remain valid
143
interpretative criteria, in descending order of importance, and
form the basis of BVT.
First, as to words, I contend, with Blackstone, that the ordinary
144
meaning is generally dispositive, unless the words are a term of
145
art.
Second, if there be doubt, recourse may be had to other
138. Professor Eskridge has offered a tenable originalist understanding of the
Article III “judicial power” that would afford federal judges what he terms
“ameliorative, suppletive, and voidance” powers. Id. at 996. Eskridge contends
that these non-textual powers to respectively limit, expand, or ignore statutory text
were used to varying degrees during the founding period and thereafter. See id. at
1009–30. He also comes to the somewhat remarkable conclusion that “the
Framers practiced and preached a highly contextual approach [to
interpretation],” one “sophisticated [and] cosmopolitan” and thus “much more
like that of Justice Stevens” than that of originalists. Id. at 1087. But Eskridge
nevertheless concedes that even his originalist theory may be open to criticism. See
id. at 993 n.13. In any event, the matter cannot be resolved in a book review (let
alone a footnote), and lest the author be guilty of “history-in-law,” i.e., a sort of
slapdash farrago of citations meant to convince (or hoodwink) the unsuspecting
and untrained reader—see Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The
Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 909, 917 (1996)—I shall decamp from
the field of battle without conceding the war.
139. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 28–34
(2d ed., Transaction Publishers 2006).
140. Reliance upon Blackstone is not meant to imply that textualism as known
today was the hermeneutic of choice for all English jurists. See Heydon’s Case,
(1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Q.B.).
141. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *59.
142. Id. How little the interpretive endeavor has changed in 250 years!
143. Blackstone would have agreed. In discussing these signs, Blackstone was
careful to note that their relevance was predicated upon an ambiguous text of
doubtful meaning. See id. at *60 (“If words happen to be still dubious . . . .”), *61
(“But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning
of a law, when the words are dubious . . . .”).
144. Rather than agree with Professor Eskridge’s contention that “[t]he many
faces of words should stand as a caution that Logos (textualism, old or new) is a
Janus-faced god,” Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1106, one ought instead to hold fast to
Saint John’s affirmation of objective intelligibility, see John 1:1.
145. BLACKSTONE, supra note 141, at *59.
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146

sections of the law, or to other laws; and a word having two or
more meanings will be accorded that meaning which best
147
harmonizes with the manifest purpose of the statute.
Third, if
the plain meaning produces an absurd—as opposed to merely an
undesirable—outcome, the meaning of the words may be varied
148
ever so slightly.
In short, BVT holds that: (1) words have
meaning, both ordinary and (sometimes) specialized; (2) these
meanings can be ascertained by non-specialist judges and applied
149
to a variety of factual scenarios presented before them; (3) word
meaning can also be ascertained without recourse to socio-cultural
context; (4) ambiguous language can be clarified with interpretive
150
canons of especially long standing; (5) recourse to non-statutory
146. Id. at *60.
147. By “manifest” purpose, it is meant a purpose much more easily discerned
than what Justice Breyer sets forth. For example, the word “tender” in a banking
law should be interpreted as pertaining to the legality of script and coin and not to
the doneness of a cut of beef. See id.
148. Id. But no provision should be made for the “reason and spirit” of the
law. Even for Blackstone, that theory of interpretation was essentially no longer
law but equity. See id. at *61. It is interesting to note that Blackstone mentions the
canon cessante ratione, cessat lex (the reason for the law having ceased, the law itself
ceases), to which Justice Breyer himself has recently cited. See Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (citing 1 COKE’S INSTITUTES *70b).
149. Thus I disagree strongly with Professor Tribe (surprise!), who seems to
turn originalism and textualism into a cramped hermeneutic that would preclude
judges from applying the law to a factual scenario not expressly contemplated in
the text. See Lawrence Tribe & Michael Dorff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1061–62 (1990). In a word, Professor Tribe would
have textualists do without their deductive powers. See id. Heaven forfend!
150. Not included are those canons that relate to legislative intent only by the
fiction that the legislature prefers one policy to another. Among these are the
avoidance canon, see, for example, Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation
in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397 (2005), where the courts will construe
a statute so as to avoid constitutional questions (because Congress by policy choice
opts not to push the edges of its regulatory envelope sub silentio) and the
appropriations canon, see generally Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the
Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669 (2005), where the courts will
not infer legislative change based upon budgetary changes (because Congress by
policy choice opts not to legislate indirectly through the purse), or even further
removed, the policy canons such as the rule of lenity, ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 37, at 655 (ambiguities in criminal statutes will be construed in favor of the
defendant), or the (wretched) rule against implied tax deductions, see, e.g.,
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (tax deductions are to be
strictly construed). Included are only those linguistic canons that, although
distantly based upon purpose, are more directly concerned with divining meaning
through accepted custom and word usage.
The canons are sound tools of interpretation, although much criticism
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materials is both insupportable in theory and unreliable in
151
(6) rules extracted from statutory text should be
practice;
defined at the lowest level of generality—conversely, the highest
152
level of specificity—that the language will bear;
and
(7) ambiguous statutory language not susceptible of interpretation
through canons should be treated either under the rubric of the
153
“inkblot” theory or should not be enforced on the grounds that
Congress has unconstitutionally delegated lawmaking power to the
154
judiciary.
The application of BVT to the cases discussed above
has been leveled against them. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (for every canon there is an equal and opposite canon);
Stephen N. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely
Eyes To You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1992) (concluding that canons are used by
judges to reach preferred policy results); Sunstein, supra note 134, at 452 (“Almost
no one has had a favorable word to say about the canons in many years.”).
Perhaps the whole conundrum about the propriety of judges’ use of canons can
be avoided through congressional adoption of selected canons. See generally
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085 (2002) (challenging the argument that the courts should adopt canons
of statutory interpretation, and arguing instead that Congress should use its
authority to adopt such canons).
151. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 35–37. See also Jackson, supra note 94, at 124.
I, like other opinion writers, have resorted not infrequently to legislative
history as a guide to the meaning of statutes. I am coming to think it is a
badly overdone practice, of dubious help to true interpretation and one
which poses serious practical problems for a large part of the legal
profession. . . . And, after all, should a statute mean to a court what was in
the minds but not put into the words of men behind it, or should it mean
what its language reasonably conveys to those who are expected to obey
it?
Id. at 124.
152. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (Scalia, J.) (opining that courts should select “the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified”). See Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 6–7, for an interesting
discussion of generality versus specificity in statutory interpretation. See also id. at
11–12 for the argument that purposivist analysis (and thus higher levels of
generality) do not necessarily capture real intent. See also Frank Easterbrook,
Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 351–52 (1992) (noting that
debates about constitutionally protected fundamental rights turn upon the level of
generality with which the right is defined or placed in the “tradition,” be that
legal, cultural, or historical).
153. See BORK, supra note 21, at 166 (“A provision whose meaning cannot be
ascertained is precisely like a provision that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated
past deciphering by an ink blot. No judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the
ground that there must be something under it.”).
154. See, e.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Corp., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
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consistently produces different results from those provided by
Justice Breyer’s reasonable legislator criterion. In the FSIA case,
BVT would reach the majority’s result, but on the ground that the
meaning of the word “ownership,” within the context of a statutory
provision regarding corporate proprietary relationships, is plain.
Ownership should be equated with possession of a majority of
shares, and thus direct subsidiary status. An interpreter should not
bother to investigate whether reading ownership as a very general
term (nomen generalissimum) might produce a preferred policy
result. As for the employment-contract exception under section 1
of the FAA, BVT would again side with the majority’s result on the
ground that the canon ejusdem generis is dispositive, and the BVTdirected judge would not trouble with the temporally sensitive
interpretive concerns of the dissenting opinions and Justice Breyer.
Lastly, BVT would coincide in result with the majority opinion in
the AEDPA case on the ground that the canon inclusio unius exclusio
alterius and the rule against superfluities are determinative.
There is always room for debate as to whether BVT has been
properly applied, for in all these cases the dissents and Justice
Breyer contend that the text is not plain and that the canons
produce equivocal results. But that fact does not call into question
the integrity of BVT as an interpretive tool. It merely confirms that
reasonable people may reach reasonable yet differing results using
BVT analysis, and this can happily be attributed to the law’s
wonderful complexity. But once Justice Breyer and his purposivist
colleagues throw up their hands and declare that the text can no
longer help and that recourse must be had to purpose, then we
have reached a dialectical impasse of sorts. In the long run, wrong
BVT results are preferable to right purposivist analysis precisely
because (1) identification of meaning through plain language is
usually easier than divination of purpose, and (2) BVT is far less
likely to become, either consciously or inadvertently, a mask to
conceal the implementation of judges’ policy preferences.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Justice Breyer declares that “[l]aw is tied to life, and a failure
to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very
155
human activity that law seeks to benefit.”
Indeed, law is tied to
life; but the question for Justice Breyer and us is better put as,
155.

BREYER, supra note 1, at 100.
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“Who has primary responsibility for determining when the law is no
longer accurately enough tied to Life?” And further, “Whose
responsibility is it to change the law when it does not track to Life?”
Surely, the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution, and most
Americans today, would consider it to be the peculiar province of
the people, through their elected representatives, to make both
determinations, and not the province of the judiciary. And this,
one suspects, is the ultimate divide between purposivists of Justice
Breyer’s stripe and adherents of BVT: may the American federal
judiciary seek to improve statutory law through reasonable,
justifiable, yet ultimately creative interpretation, or should it resign
itself, in all humility, to the role of the legislature’s faithful agent?
Justice Breyer has offered us, in Active Liberty, a sustained and wellconstructed if not ultimately convincing harmonization of these
two options. I would urge the Justice, and his adherents, at least to
recognize the incommensurability and to choose which path they
shall take.
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